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What happened after Kargil Pak India

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By the end of July, the Kargil War was ended and the situation along the Line of Control had largely returned to normal. In this situation, India caused trouble. With its MIG jets, India attacked an unarmed aircraft flying in Pakistani airspace. On a training flight, it was an Atlantic aircraft from the Pakistani Navy. In this tragedy, 16 Pakistanis lost their lives. India’s decision to start a war that had already ended was provocative. Pakistan, however, chose to appeal to the International Court of Justice rather than fomenting war panic.

In order to obtain compensation for the harm it endured, Pakistan filed a petition against India. Pakistan’s petition was denied by the ICJ due to jurisdictional issues. The IJC encouraged India and Pakistan to settle their differences amicably and via dialogue. Admiral Fasih Bokhari, head of Pakistan’s navy, resigned when the International Court of Justice declined to consider the case. The Nawaz Sharif administration was likewise ousted just ten days after he resigned.

What transpired between the return from Kargil and the overthrow of the government? I’m Faisal Warriach, and I’ll demonstrate all of this for you using the “Dekho, Suno, Jano” series on the history of Pakistan. On July 4, PM Nawaz Sharif and US President Bill Clinton reached an understanding about the unconditional return of Pakistani troops from Kargil. The accord would determine Nawaz Sharif’s future as well as that of Pakistan. The Pakistani populace abhorred this choice to declare a cease-fire. Protest marches were started by the opposition all around Pakistan. Forces from the political, religious, and jihadi worlds all mobilize to oppose Nawaz Sharif. Jamaat-e-Islami (the JI) declared that this agreement would be observed on a “dark day.”

Altaf Hussain, the founder of the MQM, referred to the accord as a betrayal of the nation. Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan urged the populace to maintain the momentum of the anti-government demonstrations. A young politician named Imran Khan pleaded with the Army Chief not to allow political interference in defense matters. After returning from Kargil, Maulana Fazlur Rehman felt that the state’s sovereignty was in grave danger. Before the official announcement of the return from Kargil, the JI started to urge Martial Law. The Mujahideen, who are alleged to be fighting in Kargil, refused the cease-fire and declared their intention to advance to Sri Nagar. Salladuddin, the commander of Hizbul Mujahideen, declared that the war will go on in a different way.

As time went on, political groups on all sides intensified their opposition to Nawaz Sharif. Benazir Bhutto vehemently opposed the return from Kargil when she was outside the country at the time. She urged the PPP employees to prepare for combat with the army since she supported the conflict. The PPP also announced the protest movement’s schedule in response to the rulers’ return from Kargil. The return from Kargril upset the opposition so much that it was referred as as Nawaz Sharif’s assistance to India. It said that Nawaz Sharif orchestrated the Kargil disaster to aid Indian PM Vajpaee in his election campaign. The army was also enlisted by the opposition, and traders participated in a strike by closing their shops.

The “go-Nawaz-go” demonstration was now in full force, and the Prime Minister was clearly the target of the scenario. However, the world’s friends and allies of Pakistan were in favor of pulling out the soldiers from Kargil. Nawaz Sharif’s declaration of his departure from Kargil received explicit support from Saudi Arabia. According to a claim by Karman Khan, the US and China tried to persuade the PM when he returned from Kargil. On his return from Kargil, Nawaz Sharif gave off the idea that he had the backing of the US, Saudi Arabia, and China. Before and after the forces left Kargil, Nawaz Sharif traveled to these nations. Additionally, these nations backed a diplomatic settlement to the Kashmir conflict in addition to the pullout.

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However, their assistance was useless because the issue existed within Pakistan and protests were being held there. The political establishment was suffering as a result of its choice to leave Kargil. It was also untrue that the Kargil war’s architects were sitting quietly. In addition to these four generals, the officers also encountered a strong backlash from the Jawans. The hard-fighting Jawans who had to endure all kinds of difficulties were interrogating their officers. The three generals who had protected the Kargil operation, including General Musharraf, were now in peril. General Musharraf made a crucial choice in this instance. He started dropping by the Military Courts.

He had an intriguing “issue” during his visit. He repeatedly refuted the Pakistani army troops’ presence on the Kargil heights as he claimed in his book, but they were Kashmiri Mujahid. But he was unable to assert it in front of the Pakistani Army’s Jawans. These jawans made sacrifices while enduring extremely trying circumstances days’ worth of distance inside the LoC. They had seen their coworkers sacrifice themselves in Kargil. Because of this, General Pervez Musharraf was using a different line of reasoning to appease them. The reasoning was identical to that used by the opposition and religious parties during the public protest. It was about characterizing the Kargil conflict and the troop retreat as political choices.

In Kargil, Musharraf claimed to have had India by the neck, but the political choice to withdraw eventually materialized. However, Musharraf was unable to convince the Jawans who had endured hardships during the Kargil conflict of this argument. In particular, Gen. Musharraf had to deal with an extremely hostile response during his visit to Quetta. If retreat had to be the result of the PM’s visit to the US, the soldiers demanded an explanation for why they had been sent to Kargil. Not only Gen. Musharraf but also his three other fellow generals experienced the same harsh response. Gen. Javed Hassan, who had commanded the operation in Kargil from the front, found himself in a challenging circumstance at Noshehra. A captain here questioned Gen.

Javed Hassain, did he envision the enemy’s response to the Kargil war? The response was “no.” General Musharraf and his associates were unaware of an issue that was more serious than the queries of the Jawans. The issue at hand was the retrieval of the bodies of the Jawans who had died in combat along the Line of Control.

However, the political and military leadership had found themselves in an absurd predicament since they were covering up the facts. The presence of Pakistani military on the Kargil heights was disputed by General Musharraf and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Therefore, it was a sad reality that some troops who died in battle could not have their remains returned. The generals who fought alongside General Musharraf in the Kargil war had endorsed this truth.

Dr. Shahid Masood was told by Gen. Jamshed Gulzar Kiyani, the police commander for Rawalpindi, on a Geo News show. “The bodies of those Jawans who died in Kargil have not yet been returned.” The ISI Analysis was commanded by Lt. Gen. Shahid Aziz. Wing writes, “ye khamoshi kahan tak” in his work. that neither Gen. Musharraf returned the dead troops’ remains nor made public their precise number.

The 4 Generals received harsh criticism for the Kargil war from both active-duty military personnel and retired service members. Former Chief of the General Staff Gen. (retd) Ali Kuli Khan was one of the Kargil war’s detractors. Both during the Kargil operation and in a post-operation interview, Gen. Ali had expressed his outspoken opposition to it.

He called the Kargil operation a legendary military miscalculation. He described the generals’ action as being unprofessional. The generals were under internal pressure, but the civil side was under intense pressure from all directions. The army, the opposition, the Kashmiri Jehadi groups, and even the media were against Nawaz Sharif. At this juncture in history, a prime minister who had received a historic mandate just two years prior stood alone. Another martial law was about to be declared in Pakistan due to the PM’s isolation and his deteriorating relationships with the army.

But the circumstances are not favorable for it. However, certain outside events were crucial in setting up the circumstances that opened the way for it. A single one of them happened in Washington, DC. Newspapers in the US produced advertising with derogatory statements on the Pakistani Army. These adverts, which exaggerated the supposed dangers from Pakistan to India, appear to have been sponsored by India. Gen. Musharraf was determined to have this advertisement contradicted. He wants the government to file a lawsuit against the US media and seek damages. And the hostile campaign against the Pakistani Army needs to receive a commensurate response.

In this regard, the Army Chief also addressed a message to the Prime Minister, but he chose not to respond. The top military hierarchy and the opposition were further irritated by this. Washington was Nawaz Sharif’s last resort for assistance in this predicament. Why? It was the meeting from July 4, 1999, which we previously covered in the final installment of this series. President Clinton agreed to taking a personal interest in settling the Kashimir dispute during the meeting, in addition to agreeing on the unconditional return from Kargil. Nawaz Sharif thought that his standing in the public view would improve as a result of President Clinton’s assistance in the Kashmir dispute.

However, President Clinton had another justification for offering assistance in the Kashmir crisis. And the US efforts to apprehend Osama bin Laden were the cause. The US then requested Pakistan’s assistance to get Osama because the Taliban were guarding him in Afghanistan. You were already made aware of the US’s motivations for wanting to apprehend Osama in the 39th episode of this series. Bill Clinton committed assistance in resolving the Kashmir issue out of his intense desire to catch Osama. Osama bin Laden’s capture is the responsibility of security agencies. However, the Pakistani Army did not show any interest in detaining Osama. Because the GHQ thought looking for Osama in Afghanistan would be like looking for a needle in a haystack.

Nawaz Sharif, the prime minister, has a backup strategy. Prince Sultan, the Saudi Arabian defense minister, and Lt. Gen. Ziauddin Butt, the DG of the ISI, were the major figures in the plot. The Saudi Defense Minister was used in the initial attempt. Prince Sultan and Taliban Foreign Minister Mullah Muttawakil met in Islamabad at Nawaz Sharif’s request. In addition to these three individuals, there was an interpreter present at the conference. The Taliban Minister was reminded by Prince Sultan of Saudi assistance to them and acceptance of their administration.

He lamented the Taliban’s indifference to all Saudi generosity and their lack of gratitude. Muttawakil took the Saudi Minister’s remark, “You are ungrateful,” very seriously and refused to surrender Osama at any price. The Saudi defense minister was very concerned by this direct response. Here, the seeds of mistrust between the Saudi Kingdom, the Pakistani government, and the Taliban were planted. After this unsuccessful meeting, PM Nawaz Sharif made a second attempt. He dispatched Taliban Ameer Mullah Omar in Afghanistan Lt. Gen. Ziduddin Butt, DG ISI. Maj-Gen. Jamshed Gulzar Kiyani also traveled to Afghanistan with the DG ISI. At the beginning of October 1999, the DG ISI had a meeting with Mullah Omar at a modest Kandahar mosque.

He expressed his sorrow at the kid and wife of Mullah Omar’s tragic deaths. He then explained to Mullah Omar why he was there. Mullah Omar said that Osama bin Laden “had stood up like a bone in the throat which he could neither swallow nor drink” when he discovered that Pakistan wanted to hand over Osama. Omar Mullah stated “I have promised to defend Osama because I am an Afghan. I must honor my obligation as a result. Alternatively, if any of us pass away.” He insisted that Osama bin Laden leave the group if he wasn’t turned over.

When Mullah Omar determined that Pakistan was under international pressure because of the Taliban, he reportedly ordered Pakistan to stop backing them. Mullah Omar pledged to defend Osama at all costs rather than being branded a “traitor,” demonstrating his faith in Allah. By this point, Nawaz Sharif had ruled out reaching Osama bin Laden via negotiations with the Taliban. At the beginning of October 1999, there were four significant terrorist attacks in four different Pakistani cities. Up to 19 people died in those instances. CM Shehbaz Sharif blamed the Taliban-trained terrorists for these incidents based on evidence.

Shehbaz asked that Afghanistan deliver these terrorists to them. And this demand put an end to any possibility of getting assistance from the Taliban about Osama’s custody. In this context, America and Pakistan came up with a covert strategy to apprehend Osama. The US was supposed to train Pakistani commandos to capture Osama bin Laden as part of the plan. Although the Pakistani military leadership did not fully support this strategy, considerable progress was made. Lt-Gen Ziauddin Butt, DG ISI, showed a lot of interest in advancing this strategy. Here, it’s important to know who Gen. Ziauddin Butt was. Gen. Butt was a close ally of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who named him Director General of the ISI in 1988.

Both Gen. Pervez Musharraf and Gen. Ziauddin Butt were trusted by Nawaz Sharif, who also held them in low regard. The appointment of the DG, ISI was constitutionally permitted for the Prime Minister. The DG was likewise bound by the Constitution to report to the PM, and Gen. Butt was doing the same. Gen. Musharraf disapproved of Gen. Butt on this point. The fact that Gen. Butt was not even invited to any event demonstrated how far apart he was from the Army Chief. Although Gen. Butt was in charge of the ISI’s senior officers, they remained loyal to Gen. Musharraf. The Army Chief picks the other officers in this institution even if the PM names the DG ISI. Maj-Gen. was chosen by Gen.

Ghulam Ahmad reports to Gen. Musharraf for sharing information. Maj-Gen Ghulam Ahmad, your subordinate, had been surreptitiously informing Musharraf? “He (Ghulam Ahmad) was taken to Pervez Musharraf as the rumor has it, and he was made to swear an oath in a way… that you will side with me and not Ziauddin who is very rigid about democracy,” Musharraf reportedly said. Gen. Musharraf received information from this source of Gen. Ziaduddin Butt’s trip to the United States. What was that visit to the US like, and what transpired there? In his place, Nawaz Sharif dispatched Shehbaz Sharif to the United States in September 1999.

The US was expected to discuss Osama’s capture and signing the CTBT with Pakistan during this significant visit. Pakistan required American assistance to settle the Kashmir dispute. However, discussions about Osama’s capture or death, as well as US assistance in preventing possible martial law in Pakistan, predominated the visit. America was so determined to apprehend Osama that it enlisted the help of Russia in the effort. The US was even willing to accept any demand from Pakistan during this sensitive period. Perhaps because of him, the US publicly opposed any potential constitutional violations in Pakistan. Despite the fact that the US declaration was a remarkable favor to Nawaz Sharif, the Opposition used it to its advantage.

The Opposition utilized it to highlight the Government’s frailties and its efforts to survive with US assistance. The DG ISI was in America at this time and gave a lengthy interview regarding access to Osama bin Laden. Gen. Musharraf and his colleagues were disturbed by the US statement and Gen. Butt’s visit. Gen. Musharraf believed Nawaz Sharif was looking for American assistance to have him removed from office. Gen. Musharraf convened a conference of the Army’s top officers after realizing he had been ousted. The conference uncovered a plan of action in case the PM tried to oust Gen. Musharraf as Army Chief. In case the PM called the Army Chief and his return was delayed, the meeting also decided on a course of action.

greater than usual Outside the Prime Minister’s (PM) House, one army unit was stationed. More commandos were stationed in Rawalpindi in recognition of their quick response times in critical situations. In order to listen in on every conversation and record phone calls, sophisticated equipment was installed in the PM House. Gen. Musharraf was kept up to date with discussions that were taking place at the PM House right away. In a crucial move, Gen. Musharraf gave his close friend Brig. Sallahuddin Satti command of the 111-Brigade, which is crucial to the military coup. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was now completely encircled by the noose.

The final day of September 1999 was at hand. There were only 12 days left until October 12, 1999. However, the Prime Minister was also kept up to date on events in the Army by the Intelligence Bureau (IB). The IB also provided Nawaz Sharif with a recording of Gen. Musharraf making extremely derogatory comments about the PM. All of this demonstrated how antagonistic both sides were against one another. Both parties were listening in on each other’s phone calls. However, they demonstrated their exceptional coherence and relationships in the media. To eliminate the appearance that they were reciprocating incompatible behaviors, they both did so. Two people attempted to mend fences between the Prime Minister and the Army Chief in this circumstance.

They were Ch Nisar Ali Khan and Shehbaz Sharif. They persuaded Nawaz Sharif to agree to two Pervez Musharraf demands by using shuttle diplomacy. Musharraf wanted Quetta Corps Commander Gen. Tariq Pervez to step down because he disapproved of the Kargil conflict. According to Gen. Abdul Majid Malik, Musharraf believed that Gen. Tariq had informed the PM of the decisions made at the meeting of the Corps Commanders. Second, General Musharraf demanded that rumors of his dismissal from power be refuted. Nawaz Sharif agreed to both of these requirements.

Lt. Gen. Tariq Pervez, Corps Commander in Quetta, received his order to retire. To put an end to rumors regarding his dismissal, Gen. Musharraf was also named Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee. When Admiral Fasih Bokhari announced his resignation as Naval Chief, Gen. Musharraf was just about to depart for Sri Lanka. Later, in an interview, Bokhari stated that he left his position because he did not want to take part in Musharraf’s “dirty game” after learning about the coup’s intention. But at the time, Musharraf’s extra post and the shooting down of the Atlantic were cited as the reasons for Bokhari’s resignation.

Then, this viewpoint was also supported by several channels. The PM gave Adm. Fasih Bokhari a send-off lunch upon his resignation. The meal was also attended by Gen. Musharraf. After a delicious lunch, everyone departed. Gen. Musharraf traveled for Sri Lanka as scheduled. The military and civic ties seemed to have normalized, and everything appeared to have calmed down. But what transpired over the course of the following four days turned everything on its head and sent Pakistan back into martial law. We had questioned you on the length of the History of Pakistan series.

We are extremely appreciative to the almost 17000 viewers who participated in this poll. 92% of respondents favored extending the series through 2018. We have chosen to continue the History of Pakistan series in light of your votes and love for the DSJ. Therefore, the current and next episodes are not the final ones, and the series will continue until 2013. After a pause, the history from 2014 will be released. Because the truth must be revealed in the context of earlier events, history after 2013 needs some time.

The history’s makers have written books, given interviews, or written articles to remove the dust from these occurrences. The truth and reality are not always revealed by what our unaided eyes can see. Therefore, at this point, the series will go through 2013. Please subscribe to our Dekho, Suno, Jano (DSJ) channel and don’t forget to click the “bell icon” so that you receive all of our updates and videos on time.Contact Us

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